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We are delighted to share in the debate about the RDoC program, as we
feel some responsibility for its birth. Indeed, the notion articulated in RDoC to
inform “future versions of psychiatric
nosologies based upon neuroscience
and behavioral science rather than
descriptive phenomenology”, by providing “a framework for conducting
research in terms of fundamental circuit-based behavioral dimensions that
cut across traditional diagnostic categories” (1), is a direct outgrowth of studies that began in the Clinical Brain Disorders Branch of the Intramural Research Program of the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) at St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital in the early 1980s.
This body of work led to the creation
of the Genes, Cognition and Psychosis
program, an interdisciplinary research
program which in its title recognized
that the biology of psychopathology
was not linked to diagnostic nomenclature. The work of this program in identifying mechanisms in the brain by
which risk factors influenced biological
susceptibility was a foundation of the
Strategic Plan launched by the NIMH
in 2008 and in which the RDoC plan
was proffered.
Given our experience with work that
forms so much of the rationale for
RDoC, we should be enthusiastic. So,
why are we not?
Actually, the debate between “lumpers” and “splitters”, whether in the
realms of descriptive psychopathology
or in brain imaging measurements or in
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genetics, has been going on literally for
over a century in psychiatry. The RDoC
project claims to be a new and enlightened way to split and then lump, because it argues that the neuroscience
and genetics of psychiatric disorders
open new arenas for such progress.
This sounds really good, but to paraphrase a popular beer advertisement
in the USA, does it taste great?
We see the main concerns about the
RDoC mindset not with its conceptual
foundations, but with its reliance on the
presumed validity of the behavioral,
neural functional and genetic dimensions it highlights as fundamental to a
revision of psychiatric nomenclature.
Ultimately, any revision of psychiatric
diagnosis, which clearly is the RDoC
goal, must be better than the existing
system, better in the sense of what diagnosis is about. Diagnosis is primarily an
instrument used by clinicians for two
primary purposes: to predict the natural
history of an illness and to predict the
most appropriate treatment. This will be
the standard also for RDoC, if its longterm goal of replacing existing diagnostic practices is to be realized.
Even clear and important dimensions of behavior and its reward-based
underpinnings may have unexpected
complexities when viewed through the
RDoC lens. In an incisive and elegant
study, Gold et al (2) demonstrated that
negative symptoms in schizophrenia
are associated with overestimating the
cost (or effort) involved in attaining an
outcome. One could easily view this as a
metric or dimension, suggestive of “degrees” of negative symptoms. One can
imagine elegant neuroimaging studies
of effort estimation showing varying
engagement of prefrontal, insular, and
striatal function.
Cuthbert’s suggestion that a good research study would be to explore such
behavioral and neural system dimensions across current diagnostic groups
and in subjects without psychiatric

diagnoses presents a daunting conundrum. For example, “overestimating the
cost (or effort) involved in attaining an
outcome” also seems to be a suitable
operational definition of laziness, as
used by lay individuals. Thus, an important question is whether this or any of
the RDoC dimensions have the same
meaning when associated with schizophrenia qua schizophrenia, or if they
are observed across other diagnoses
and in a spectrum of otherwise normal,
albeit, lazy individuals. Moreover,
would the neural systems and genomics
that are associated with this set of
behaviors be the same in all cases? Several recent papers focus on this issue.
They suggest, for example, that mechanisms for auditory hallucinations in
otherwise healthy functioning individuals (so called “voice-hearers”) may be
different than the mechanisms associated with such symptoms in schizophrenia (3).
It has become increasingly popular
to believe that similar patterns of brain
activity in patients with psychiatric illness and in some non-psychiatric research samples underlie RDoC-type
dimensions of psychopathology. These
studies are based on specific protocols
that elicit physiological responses critically dependent on the context. It is an
old saying in the functional neuroimaging research lexicon that functional
neuroimaging data reflect what the
brain was doing during the imaging protocol, but the challenge for the investigator is to figure out what the brain was
actually doing. The meaning of this saying is that patterns of engagement of
brain functional systems during an
imaging experiment do not necessarily
reflect a specific or even definable brain
state. A clear illustration of this is the
current fascination with the so-called
resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment,
where subjects, including diverse samples of psychiatric patients, are allowed
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to lie in the confining and noisy environment of the MRI scanner for five to
ten minutes doing nothing. This is said
to be a resting or unstimulated state and
the pattern of activity typically seen in
normal subjects after they have acclimatized to the scanner environment is
called the “default network”. Part of
the appeal of this paradigm is that it is
easy to do and easy to find differences
between patient and control samples.
Patients with a variety of psychiatric
diagnoses have been observed to have
deviations from the default pattern, and
it is often stated that they show a deficiency or abnormality of the default
network as if this is some sort of neural
defect. Clearly, the relative engagement
or lack thereof of the default network is
a dimension putatively linked to a neural circuit. Do we imagine that patients
currently diagnosed with schizophrenia, or children with autism, or patients
with Alzheimer’s disease, all of whom
may show similar patterns of default
network deviations, share pathology in
this dimension? Sounds good, but does
it taste great? In fact, it is highly implausible that patients with schizophrenia or
with autism will experience the MRI
environment analogously to a paid
healthy volunteer and it is unlikely that
they will each experience it the same,
either. The different ways in which they
are liable to think and feel about the
noise and the confinement will interfere
with the so-called default system, producing a potentially similar degree of
abnormality on this dimension, but
based on dissimilar reasons.
The current approach to caseness is
rooted in many decades of clinical observation and detailed description of
clinical course and natural history, and
many academic debates about how best
to represent clinical reality. This rich
history has also witnessed many selfproclaimed enlightened movements to
change the scheme. In the absence of
pathognomonic findings, diagnosis is
imprecise and multidimensional, as it
is in other fields of medicine. The idea
that RDoC is a blueprint for research to
fill in this multidimensional landscape
is appealing and attractive. But, as an
approach to ultimately revise the con-

cept of caseness, it has a much more
difficult task.
One of the most important components of any diagnostic scheme that is
conspicuously missing from the RDoC
phenomenology matrix is the dimension of time. The DSM-5 regards time
as an essential aspect of most diagnostic
categories. In neurology, it is said that
time is the best diagnostician. Good
psychiatric clinicians know that crosssectional phenomenology is problematic, and what looks like obsessive-compulsive disorder today, may turn out to
be psychosis tomorrow. What looks like
schizophrenia early on in the course of a
patient’s history turns out to be bipolar
disorder down the road. Were these
examples to have been treated based
on the RDoC dimensions, the outcome
might not be optimum, to say the least.
Indeed, as much as there is overlap phenomenologically and perhaps genetically in what we call schizophrenia
and what we call bipolar disorder, and
patients across these categories will
share many RDoC dimensions, it is
indisputable that for some patients
with the latter diagnosis, lithium is as
miraculous as any treatment in psychiatry, yet it is entirely without antipsychotic effects in patients with the former
diagnosis.
There is good evidence that diagnosis
per se is a social construct and is dependent on where on a continuum some
relatively arbitrary threshold a caseness
call gets made (4). The DSM system has
always recognized that having symptoms is not sufficient for a clinical diagnosis. There must also be disability. Illness and disability or functional compromise are inseparable concepts. Regardless of the in vogue phenomenology, illness begets disability. Even between mild cognitive impairment and
Alzheimer’s disease there is a grey area.
An unbiased way at looking at symptoms, cognition, etc., involving threshold-free dimensions, has been thought
to be a valid alternative. However, this
fails to account for notable differences
at the severe ends of the spectrum that
may encompass multiple dimensions
and the possibility that “disease” neurobiology can accelerate.

It’s a no brainer that psychiatric diagnosis is imperfect, subjective and not
based on pathophysiology or causation,
and the field is eagerly anticipating a
future where this would be different.
Psychiatric practitioners are faced with
realworld patientswithrealworld problems and their decisions are not readily
informed by rarefied fMRI paradigms
and weak genetic associations. They
use diagnosis to help them organize the
complex clinical landscape.
Most clinicians know that the diagnoses they apply are approximations,
that they refer to syndromes not distinct
disease entities, and that they do not
express distinct boundaries. They understand that our diagnoses are constructs, and that patients do not have
schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, per
se; they are given these diagnoses.
These realities seem to have surprised
researchers, many of whom unfortunately know about psychiatric illnesses
only from what they read in the literature or on their computer screens.
Our current approach to psychiatric
diagnosis is the result of many decades
of deep clinical experience and scholarly debate. As imperfect as it is, it is a practical and clinically useful tool that has
helped transform psychiatry from subjective, impressionistic categorization
of clinical syndromes to more objective,
diagnostically reliable definitions. The
field would be dramatically enhanced
by a better system, as would many other
fields of medicine. But, the adoption of
an alternative phenomenology must be
viewed with caution and it must result
in something better than what we have.
This means more clinically valuable to
practitioners and to patients.
We suspect that RDoC will be liberating to some researchers, because they
will be encouraged to move beyond current diagnosis in designing clinical research projects. Does this require a major NIMH initiative that co-opts the
grant review process and has the unintended consequence of actually reducing creativity by its very mandate and
also of potentially undermining clinical
practice? One might hope that researchers and clinicians alike are continuing to
think outside the box and are exploring
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new ways of solving old problems without the NIMH telling them that they are
not.
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Wittgenstein’s nightmare: why the RDoC grid needs a
conceptual dimension
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RDoC attempts to finesse an existential dilemma facing psychiatry: psychiatry is most persuasively a medical
field if mental disorders are understood
as brain disorders, but brain disorders
seem to fall under neurology. The RDoC
attempts to resolve this dilemma by distinguishing brain circuit malfunctions
as the distinctive domain of psychiatry:
“the RDoC framework conceptualizes
mental illness as brain disorders; in contrast to neurological disorders with
identifiable lesions, mental disorders
can be addressed as disorders of brain
circuits” (1). RDoC further locates brain
circuit function within a grid of analytical and developmental levels and
dimensions that together are supposed
to replace DSM/ICD categories with
more valid diagnoses.
Wittgenstein famously said: “In psychology there are experimental methods
and conceptual confusion. . . The existence of the experimental method
makes us think we have the means of
solving the problems that trouble us;
though problem and method pass one
another by” (2). RDoC is a paradigmatic
expression of Wittgenstein’s concerns. It
joins an ambitious empirical research
program with a conceptual framework
so weak that it is difficult to envision success. I consider below some of the
RDoC’s apparent conceptual challenges.
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RDoC embraces brain-circuit construct validity without addressing conceptual validity, thus gets the relationship wrong between itself and the DSM/
ICD. The RDoC sees the DSM/ICD’s
failures when it comes to construct
validity (i.e., each diagnosis identifying
one etiological category), but fails to
appreciate DSM/ICD’s essential role
in psychiatric legitimacy. The DSM/
ICD identifies conditions that, judging
from surface symptoms, context, and
background knowledge of normal human functioning, fall under the concept
of disorder. Correctly distinguishing
between disorder and normality is what
I have labeled conceptual validity. Conceptual validity is independent of construct validity: a DSM/ICD disorder
category can encompass ten different
disorders and thus lack construct validity, but be conceptually valid if it encompasses only disorders, and it can be construct valid but identify a non-disorder
and thus be conceptually invalid. Most
criticisms of DSM-5 were accusations
of conceptual invalidity, that criteria
encompassed normal variations. Whatever its errors, DSM/ICD remains an
attempt to delineate the domain of psychological conditions that fall under the
concept of disorder. RDoC offers nothing to replace the DSM/ICD efforts to
delineate the domain of disorders and
provide a target at which construct validation can aim. DSM/ICD provides
the only thoughtful guidance to what
conditions the RDoC must explain in
terms of malfunctioning circuits.

RDoC pays inadequate attention to
context. RDoC’s grid includes environmental influences, but by this RDoC
means environmental risk factors like
early traumas or disturbed attachment
relations that influence the trajectory of
disorder development. Nowhere in the
RDoC grid is there adequate recognition that human psychological mechanisms are biologically designed to respond sensitively to the social and environmental context. No diagnostic
scheme can be valid without building
ample contextual references into diagnostic criteria, as does the DSM (3).
RDoC is confused about which of
two meanings of “etiology” is pertinent
to disorder diagnosis. Ultimately, etiology individuates disorders. This is why,
when multiple etiologies are discovered
in formerly unified diagnostic entities,
they divide into several disorders, as in
recent developments regarding breast
cancer. But, what is an etiology? In the
context of mental disorder, “etiology” is
ambiguous, having a broader and narrower meaning (4). In the broad sense,
“etiology” refers to the causal story by
which a disorder comes about. Such
causal histories can encompass anything that led to the disorder, including
risk factors, environmental events,
common genetic variations, and other
factors that are not in themselves disordered but were part of the pathway that
led to the disorder. As indicated in its
grid, RDoC studies the entire developmental trajectory that leads to disorder,
adopting what I call a “kitchen sink”
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